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Abstract:  
As long as there is no effective state aid control outside the EU, the European 
Commission faces a dilemma: either European firms will be disadvantaged in global 
competition by strict EU rules, or the Commission will come under pressure to relax 
the rules, thereby running the risk that fair competition within the EU will be 
undermined. As a consequence, the Commission attempts to promote EU rules on 
state aid and public procurement beyond EU borders – in non-member countries as 
well as at the WTO level. This article analyses the Commission’s channels of 
regulatory transfer and the factors accounting for its varying success. Bilateral 
cooperation provides many opportunities to spread European state aid rules, but 
decentralised enforcement at the national level remains ultimately deficient. 
Moreover, the transfer of European rules to the multilateral WTO depends heavily on 
the EU’s ability to reach prior consensus with its most powerful partner and rival, the 
US Government.  
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1 Introduction  
When European governments set up national policies to support the automotive 
industry in the face of the economic crisis in early 2009, the European Commission 
had to strike a delicate balance. Across the Atlantic, the Obama administration was 
planning a multi-billion package of subsidies, potentially linked to a ‘Buy American’ 
clause. The European Union’s (EU) Ambassador in Washington, John Bruton, 
threatened to refer the issue to the World Trade Organization (WTO).1 At the same 
time within Europe, several governments voiced their opposition to the plans of 
French President Sarkozy to limit the receipt of state aid to companies with factories 
located in France or supplied by French sub-contractors. The EU Presidency, then 
held by Prague, arranged an informal meeting of European Heads of State and 
Government and the European Parliament passed a resolution on the future of the 
automotive industry, in which it included a plea “to accelerate, simplify and increase 
financial support for the automotive industry”.2
                                                 
1 “Fears over US Stimulus Package. Europe Warns against ‘Buy American’ Clause”, in: Spiegel Online, 2 
February 2009, online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,605185,00.html [All URLs have last 
been checked on 1 May 2010]. 
 In his intervention in the debate, the 
Slovak MEP, Sergej Kozlik, captured the dilemma in which the EU and particularly 
the Commission had to manoeuvre:  
2 “Resolution on the future of the automotive industry”, RSP/2009/2560. For the details of the parliamentary 
debate, see online: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090324& 
secondRef=ITEM-011&language=EN&ring=P6-RC-2009-0152.    
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We must prevent rivalry over subsidies between the various players on the European 
market. The situation is made more difficult by the fact that these rules do not take 
account of global competition, particularly from the US (…) Europe may face not only the 
problem of how to sort out production and sales problems in Europe, but also the problem 
of imported cars that have been produced with excessive state aid. In such a situation 
Europe could also threaten to enforce measures within a World Trade Organization 
framework.  
The Commission adopted a mixed approach. It temporarily allowed more state aid for 
the European automotive industry, insisted on non-discriminatory measures between 
member states, and called for increased efforts in the medium and long-term to 
guarantee fair competition on a global scale.3
This article concentrates on the latter aspect of promoting state aid discipline 
beyond the EU, more specifically on the Commission’s strategies to export European 
state aid and public procurement rules. While extraterritoriality, regulatory export and 
rule convergence have long been issues in traditional areas of competition policy 
such as antitrust and merger control (Friedberg 1990; Waller 1997; Wigger 2008), 
much less attention has been devoted to state aids (Van de Casteele 2006: 804). 
Some authors have analysed the implementation of state aid control under accession 
conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (Blauberger 2009; Cremona 2003), but 
less is known about rule transfer to countries that are not committed to eventual EU 
membership, e.g. countries from the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and 
associated countries. Also, the EU is actively promoting its state aid rules at the WTO 
level, albeit with limited success. Furthermore, in parallel to its efforts in regard to 
state aid control, attempts to export European rules have been undertaken in relation 
to public procurement, a field which can have strong state aid implications. Through 
which channels does the Commission promote European rules on state aid as well 
as public procurement and how can we explain its varying success?  
  
 We will address these questions in five steps. Section 2 sketches the basic 
dilemma: as long as there is no effective state aid control outside the EU, European 
firms are disadvantaged in global competition by strict EU rules, or the Commission 
comes under pressure to relax its controls, thereby running the risk that fair 
competition within the EU will be undermined. After a short outline of EU rules on 
state aid and public procurement in section 3, we analyse the Commission’s 
strategies to transfer these rules beyond the EU. Section 4 deals with horizontal 
                                                 
3 “Communication from the Commission responding to the crisis in the European automotive industry”, COM 
(2009) 104 final.  
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regulatory transfer to non-EU countries. Section 5 addresses the attempted vertical 
‘upload’ of EU rules to the WTO level. The concluding section summarizes the main 
reasons for the Commission’s varying success in exporting EU rules and discusses 
the benefits for European firms of EU regulatory transfer. 
2 European Competition vs. Global Competitiveness  
From a perspective purely oriented towards economic efficiency it might seem 
misleading to oppose ‘European competition vs. global competitiveness’. In 
numerous speeches before and after the outbreak of the financial crisis, former 
Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, reiterated her conviction that modern 
competition and industrial policies did not contradict each other, but could contribute 
jointly to making firms more competitive. Based on free competition within the EU, 
guaranteed by the Commission’s supervision, countries and firms should “use our 
Single Market as a springboard for global success” (Kroes 2008).  
Before the financial and economic crisis, however, doubts were already raised 
by various voices as to whether such a straightforward European competition 
approach neglected the fact that other countries and regions did not apply similarly 
strict competition principles. During the consultations on the Commission’s State Aid 
Action Plan (SAAP) launched in June 2005, a major share of comments deplored the 
inward-looking perspective of the Commission and its lack of global considerations 
(European Commission 2006: 8). Not just business representatives or member states 
like France and Germany, but also the Competition Law Association reminded of this 
broader issue:   
(…) the reform road map raises challenges for the Commission to balance the key 
objective of ‘less and better targeted state aid’ against the competitiveness of the EU 
economy as a whole in the global economy. Obviously the Commission will need to 
consider the economic position of the EU vis-à-vis countries such as China and India 
(which routinely provide state assistance to companies) and ensure that, at the same time 
as trying to create a level competitive playing field within the EU, the EU as a whole is not 
then put at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other major and emerging economies in 
the world. 4
In particular, the representatives of large firms criticised the Commission for its 
differentiated approach, allowing larger proportions of state aid only for small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). State aid to large firms is considered to be 
   
                                                 
4 Comments of the Competition Law Association on the EU Commission’s State Aid Action Plan, online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_saap/37551.pdf  
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especially distortive to intra-Community competition and, therefore, EU rules such as 
the Multisectoral Framework limit the ability of member governments to grant state 
aid for large regional investment projects exceeding € 100 million (Soltész 2005). 
Combined with higher costs to fulfil European environmental and social standards, 
the French business representation MEDEF argued that strict state aid rules might 
disadvantage large European firms in global competition and create an incentive for 
them to relocate to regions outside the EU.5 Hence, even if companies may well 
improve their global competitiveness in the long term due to the discipline imposed 
by European state aid rules – see e.g. the example of airline companies such as Air 
France (Kassim & Stevens 2010) – the Commission is confronted with opposite 
pressures in the short run.6
Public procurement may also have an (often implicit) state aid dimension and, 
therefore, a similar logic applies. The expansion of procurement law is primarily 
justified as a reaction to the enlargement of markets, leading to a more efficient use 
of public expenditures. The former internal market Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, 
for example, commented as follows on the extension of the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement to the enlarged EU:  
   
This is good news for the new Member States, whose companies will now be able to bid 
for government contracts in important markets all over the world. It is also good news for 
EU taxpayers, as opening up procurement markets more widely leads to better value for 
money.7
In return for the liberalisation of public contracts and the efficiency gains involved, 
however, EU member states lose certain possibilities to promote national or 
European firms by favouring them against economic actors from abroad. The only 
exception for offering support to national industry permitted under European 
procurement law concerns subcontracting for SMEs (recital 32 of the Directive 
2004/18 EC). Thus, the above outlined arguments for transferring state aid 
regulations to the international level or extended them bilaterally to other nation 
states apply mutatis mutandis for the regulation of public procurement. 
 
                                                 
5 Position adopted by MEDEF concerning the European Commission’s State Aid Action Plan, online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/comments_saap/38148.pdf  
6 See, for example, page 5 of the position of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) on 
the “EU 2020” strategy, calling for more state aid flexibility in cases of global distortions of competition. Online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/eu2020/docs/european_aeronautic_defence_space_company_en.pdf 
7 “Public procurement: WTO Government Procurement Agreement extended to the enlarged EU”, Commission 
Press Release IP/04/744, 15 June 2004.  
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As a result, the Commission faces a dilemma in cases that have both a 
European and a global dimension: European competition and global competitiveness 
cannot always be reached at the same time, but the two goals have to be balanced 
against each other. A telling case is the Commission’s treatment of Airbus. Given that 
there is no European competitor, the Commission can argue that Airbus subsidies do 
not affect trade between member states. Hence, no state aid as defined by Article 
107(1) TFEU (ex-Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty) is involved. Normally, however, 
global developments and intra-European effect are hard to disentangle. If the 
Commission strictly enforces EU rules on state aid and public procurement, it gets 
criticised for disadvantaging European firms on the global market. Conversely, if it 
gives way to the demands of large firms, competition in the internal market is 
undermined. An example of a potential loophole for weaker state aid control is the so-
called ‘matching clause’ in the Commission’s framework for research, development 
and innovation aid (Van de Casteele 2006: 804). The clause, that has not so far been 
applied, allows higher aid intensities, if “competitors located outside the Community 
have received (in the last three years) or are going to receive, aid of an equivalent 
intensity for similar projects”.8
3 EU state aid and public procurement rules 
 In order to escape this dilemma and to resist 
downward regulatory pressures, the Commission can try to extend the ‘level playing 
field’ beyond Europe, i.e. it can encourage stricter control of state aid and transparent 
public procurement outside the EU. Before we discuss these efforts to export its 
regulations to other countries and to the global level, we briefly describe their object: 
European rules on state aid and public procurement. 
The overall goal of European state aid and public procurement law is the creation of 
an internal market. Both state aid and public procurement can be obstacles within the 
internal market if public resources are used to discriminate between member states 
in order to protect and promote national firms. The rules regarding state aid are 
directly laid down in Articles 107 to 109 TFEU (ex-Articles 87 to 89 of the EC Treaty). 
In contrast, European public procurement law is not regulated in the Treaty, but has 
been established in secondary legislation. 
                                                 
8 Official Journal 2006, C 323, point 5.1.7.  
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3.1 The main principles of European state aid control 
European state aid rules are only applicable if a government measure qualifies as 
state aid in the first place. Therefore, the definition of state aid is of great importance 
but difficult to establish. In theory, many government actions result in a benefit to an 
enterprise. Furthermore governments are continually finding new ways to intervene 
and, thus, the definition of state aid cannot be static. As a result, state aid is defined 
dynamically through the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 
decisions of the Commission (Plender 2003). Based on Article 107(1) TFEU, four 
broad criteria for identifying state aid can be identified: (1) any aid; (2) that involves a 
charge on the public account; (3) that distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods; and which (4) 
affects trade between the member states.  
The general assumption of Article 107(1) TFEU is that all state aid distorts 
competition. However, in some cases state aid can be compatible with the internal 
market, notably when such measures pursue community objectives such as the 
correction of market failures. Article 107(2) TFEU establishes a per se compatibility of 
specific types of state aid with the common market. This category comprises, for 
example, state aid to compensate the damage caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences. More important and also more contested are the exceptions 
laid down in Article 107(3) TFEU. This Article establishes different categories of state 
aid which may be compatible with the common market, giving the Commission a 
margin of discretion to announce whether an aid falls under this provision. The main 
objectives the Commission refers to in its decisions are Article 107(3) a,b,c TFEU:   
(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of 
living is 
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest; 
The Commission has developed Guidelines and Communications to define these 
vague formulations in Article 107(3)a,b,c TFEU and to improve legal certainty for the 
member states. For example, regional state aid is mostly justified on the basis of 
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Article 107(3)a TFEU, temporary measures to mitigate the effects of the global 
economic crisis refer to Article 107(3)b TFEU and most other types of state aid, for 
example, for environmental protection or research, development and innovation are 
based on Article 107(3)c TFEU.  
The control of state aid is largely centralized at the European level, with the 
Commission being the key player in the control procedure. According to the directly 
effective ‘standstill clause’ in Article 108(3) TFEU and Article 2.1 of the Regulation No 
659/1999, member states must notify any measure that falls under the state aid 
definition to the European Commission and they must not implement measures 
without prior approval by the Commission. The Commission has the exclusive right to 
examine whether a notified measure is compatible with the common market, subject 
to Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU. Eventually, the Commission takes a positive, 
conditional or negative decision. If state aid is granted despite a negative decision of 
the Commission, the measure is deemed illegal and the Commission obliges the 
enterprise to repay the state aid it has received. The Commission’s decisions can be 
appealed before the European Courts. 
3.2 Public procurement law at the European level 
Unlike the case of state aid, European public procurement law is not laid down in the 
EC Treaty. Only an implicit reference can be found in Article 199 TFEU (ex-Article 
183(4) of the EC Treaty). Nevertheless, the European Commission early assumed 
that different laws concerning government procurement in the member states were 
an obstacle to trade. The Commission’s first effort to regulate this issue was the 
Commission Directive 70/32/EEC of 17 December 1969 on provision of goods to the 
State, to local authorities and other official bodies. Based on ex-Article 33(7) of the 
EC Treaty, the Commission was able to enact this Directive unilaterally. The Treaty 
provision empowered the Commission to regulate the procedure and timetable 
according to which member states had to abolish measures having an effect 
equivalent to quotas insofar as they affected cross-border trade. Although the first 
Directive lacked relevant fields of application, it already indicated the Commission’s 
determination to pursue liberalization. It mainly consisted of a list of practices which 
the member states were obliged to eliminate (Weiss 1993: 34).  
The aim of the Commission, however, to liberalise government procurement 
law could not be achieved through such an approach and, therefore, the Commission 
changed its strategy. It initiated Directives aimed at eliminating discriminatory 
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behaviour among member states mainly by coordinating national procurement 
procedures and by increasing their transparency (Bovis 2007: 8). The first of these 
Directives (71/305/EEC) was passed in 1971. Today, the Council Directives 2004/17 
and 2004/18 EC apply and had to be implemented before January 2006. Their main 
goal is the elimination of discriminatory public procurement among member states. 
The evolution of procurement regulation in the European Union is based on two 
assumptions: first, openness and transparency are necessary in order to eliminate 
discrimination in procurement procedures; and second, given that a great variety of 
regulations within the member states exists, no complete harmonisation is 
achievable. As a consequence, European rules aim to harmonise existing 
administrative practices only, while respecting a decentralised system of public 
procurement regulation (Bovis 2007: 8).  
European procurement law is applicable to contracts between an economic 
actor and a contracting authority having as their object the execution of works, the 
supply of products or the provision of services above a certain threshold (for 
example, in the case for public works it applies to contracts exceeding € 5.150.00). 
The contracting authority may be the state or its organs, including, for example, 
municipalities, government departments or public health insurance companies (cf. 
ECJ judgement 11 June 2009 [Hans & Christophorus Oymanns GbR/AOK 
Rheinland/Hamburg] No C-300/07). Transparency is to be achieved through an 
obligation to community-wide publicity and advertisement of public procurement 
contracts in the Official Journal of the European Communities. The advertisement 
has to include a full description of the purchased product or service and all other 
requirements of the contract, for example, special conditions relating to the 
performance of the contract. The stage of advertising is followed by the qualification 
and selection of the tenderers. This stage is governed by the principle of fairness. 
The contracting authorities have to define the suitability of the tenderer according to 
predefined objective criteria, such as the personal liability of the enterprise. Finally, 
the contracting authority must select the qualified tenderer that offers either the 
lowest price or the most economically advantageous. The latter criterion has to be 
assessed on the basis of measures defined in advance by the contracting authority, 
e.g. running costs, functional characteristics and environmental friendliness (Bovis 
2007: 63ff.). 
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In order to promote European state aid and public procurement rules outside 
the EU, the Commission pursues two distinct paths: bilaterally, it offers incentives for 
other countries to adopt European rules, and multilaterally it attempts to introduce 
these rules into the WTO framework. We analyse each of these approaches in turn.  
4 Regulatory transfer to non-EU countries 
The EU’s strategies to exert regulatory influence on non-member states has been a 
major concern of the literatures on EU eastward enlargement (Sedelmeier 2006) and 
on European ‘external governance’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009). According to 
Lavenex and Schimmelfenning (2009), the EU’s success in extending parts of the 
acquis communautaire beyond EU borders varies significantly across countries as 
well as policies and this variation can best be explained by institutional factors, i.e. by 
the specific instruments of regulatory transfer.  
As regards EU state aid and public procurement rules, we can distinguish 
three major groups of countries according to the EU’s instruments and the success of 
regulatory transfer (see Table 1). Apart from Switzerland, the countries of the EFTA 
are subject to state aid rules largely identical to those of the EU and rule enforcement 
has been delegated to a supranational surveillance authority closely modelled on the 
European Commission. For accession countries, adopting the entire acquis is a pre-
condition for EU membership, but, as previous enlargement rounds have shown, 
actual rule enforcement may be critical before accession. Finally, the EU has 
included provisions on state aid and public procurement into its Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAAs) in order to encourage rule adoption in associated 
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Croatia Stabilisation and Association Agreement Article 70 & Protocol 2, Article 5 
(state aid) 
Article 72 (public contracts) 
Macedonia Stabilisation and Association Agreement Article 69 & Protocol 2, Article 5 
(state aid) 
Article 72 (public contracts) 
Turkey Association Agreement, Decision 1/95  
Commission Decision of 29.02.1996 
(96/528/ECSC) 
Council Decision of 18.02.2008  
(2008/157/EC) 
Article 34 & 39 (state aid) 
Article 7,8 & Protocol 2 (state aid) 
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Albania Stabilisation and Association Agreement Article 71 & Protocol 1, Article 5 
(state aid) 
Article 74 (public contracts) 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-
Related Matters 
Article 36 & Protocol 3 (state aid) 
Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Agreement Article 73 & Protocol 5 (state aid) 
Article 76 (public contracts) 
Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement Article 73 & Protocol 5 (state aid) 
Article 76 (public contracts) 
Table 1: EU agreements with third countries including provisions on state aid and public procurement9
4.1 EFTA countries  
 
In 1992, the EC and its member states signed the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA Agreement) with five EFTA states (Austria, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden) which entered into force in 1994. In 1995, Liechtenstein joined 
the EEA Agreement while Austria, Finland, and Sweden became EU member states.  
Based on the EEA Agreement, a system of state aid control has been 
established for all EFTA states except Switzerland that is largely identical to the EU’s 
                                                 
9 Source: Author’s compilation. We thank Hannah Müller for her research assistance in generating this overview. 
A comprehensive collection of the EU’s international agreements on competition policy is provided by the 
Commission (2008), online: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/legislation/legislation.html 
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regime (Antoniadis 2002). Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement mirror Articles 
107 and 108 TFEU and protocol 26 to the agreement entrusts the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority ‘with equivalent powers and similar functions to those of the EC 
Commission’. The latter protocol also incorporates the more detailed Council 
Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (the ‘Procedural Regulation’) into the EEA Agreement. 
Accordingly, EFTA states have to notify planned state aid to the Surveillance 
Authority and they must not implement any measure without its prior approval. In 
cases of illegally granted state aid, the Surveillance Authority can oblige EFTA states 
to recover the aid. As regards substantive state aid rules, the Surveillance Authority 
holds ‘contact meetings’ with the Commission, it participates in the Commission’s 
multilateral meetings in which new or revised rules are discussed with EU member 
states and it issues guidelines that largely reflect the Commission’s secondary rules 
(ibid.: 158-160).10
Next to the Surveillance Authority, located in Brussels, the EEA Agreement 
also provides for an EFTA Court that has the same function in state aid cases as the 
ECJ and, as its prototype, has its seat in Luxembourg. Article 6 of the agreement 
establishes the homogeneity principle according to which ‘provisions of this 
Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the 
(EC) Treaty (…) shall, in their implementation and application, be interpreted in 
conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’. Moreover, the European Commission being present in all Court cases 
– before the EFTA Court as well as the European Courts – it “functions as a 
transmission belt between the two jurisdictions” (Buschle 2006: 758). 
 For example, when the Commission introduced a new category of 
‘innovation aid’ in 2006, the Surveillance Authority followed shortly after in February 
2007; the EFTA guidelines for national regional aid are applicable synchronously to 
the EU for the period from 2007 to 2013.  
Compared to the EU, the main difference of EFTA state aid control is its 
limited scope. In particular, state aid to agriculture and fisheries is not covered by the 
agreement. Switzerland is EFTA member, but it has not ratified the EEA agreement 
and, therefore, is not subject to the Surveillance Authority’s control. Apart from these 
exceptions, however, the transfer of EU state aid rules to EFTA countries is almost 
complete. Moreover, due to the delegation of decision-making powers to the 
Surveillance Authority and the Court, independent rule enforcement is guaranteed. In 
                                                 
10 For the guidelines, see online: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/ 
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2007, the Surveillance Authority started to publish a State Aid Scoreboard which is 
based on the Commission’s methodology. It exhibits deficits with regard to the 
recovery of illegal state aid in Norway and Iceland, but overall state aid levels have 
been mostly below the average of EU member states.11
In the field of public procurement the picture is similar. Article 65 of the EEA 
Agreement read together with Annex 16 requires the application of the European 
procurement regime (Bock 1993; Schnitzer 2005: 68ff; Toikka 1993). Furthermore, 
the EFTA countries are all members of the General Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
at the WTO level. As the discussion below will show, the GPA’s approach is similar to 
the European one. 
 As a consequence, when 
Austria, Finland and Sweden entered the EU in 1995, no transitory arrangements 
were required in the field of state aid and all measures that had been approved by 
the Surveillance Authority automatically received the status of ‘existing aid’, i.e. they 
were legally protected against any retrospective disapproval by the European 
Commission. 
4.2 Accession countries  
The more recent rounds of EU enlargement required more intense preparation. The 
third Copenhagen accession criterion EU membership ‘presupposes the candidate's 
ability to take on the obligations of membership’. In practice, this acquis criterion 
requires all candidate countries to align their legislation with European law before 
they can enter the Union. For this purpose, the acquis is divided into different 
chapters which can be assessed and negotiated separately during accession 
preparations (cf. Avery 2004). State aid control belongs to the competition chapter 
which is typically among the last chapters to be finalised. Public procurement issues 
used to be part of the chapter on free movement of goods for the countries that 
acceded in 2004 and 2007; current candidate countries have to discuss these issues 
in a separate chapter. Initially, the European Commission and candidate countries 
‘screen’ the entire acquis in order to identify where legislative alignment is most 
needed and, subsequently, the Commission publishes annual progress reports on 
each candidate country’s efforts.12
                                                 
11 Online: http://www.eftasurv.int/press--publications/scoreboards/state-aid-scoreboards/ 
 Apart from these reports, the Commission uses a 
variety of instruments to promote rule transfer, e.g. financial support and 
administrative assistance from member states’ civil services (‘twinning’ programs) – 
12 Online: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/progress_reports/index_en.htm 
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by far the most important tool of the Commission, however, is the incentive of EU 
membership itself (Grabbe 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004). Unless all 
negotiation chapters are successfully concluded, a candidate country cannot become 
EU member state.  
In the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that became member 
states in 2004, state aid control and procurement law procedures were virtually 
unknown before the beginning of the accession process in the mid-1990s. The legal 
obligation of CEECs to align with European state aid and public procurement rules 
was first established by the Europe Agreements, concluded between the EU, its 
member states and individual candidate countries during the 1990s (Cremona 2003). 
Nevertheless, fulfilling the acquis criterion in the realm of state aid proved to be 
particularly challenging for CEECs, given that European state aid rules cannot simply 
be implemented ‘once and for all’ into domestic law, but they have to be respected in 
the design of individual state aid measures and are applied by the Commission on a 
case by case basis. Under these circumstances, the Commission developed a novel 
approach of rule transfer to CEECs which differed fundamentally from previous 
enlargements and from other policy areas. Candidate countries had to establish 
national monitoring authorities which, until accession, were supposed to play a 
similar role as the Commission normally plays at the European level. Emulating the 
procedure of European state aid control, the granting of state aid became contingent 
on the notification to and approval by the respective national monitoring authorities. 
Furthermore, in their assessment of individual aid measures, national authorities 
were bound to apply the entire state aid acquis ‘including the present and future 
secondary legislation, frameworks, guidelines and other relevant administrative acts 
in force in the Community, as well as the case law of the Court(s)’ (cf. Schütterle 
2002: 581). Between 1997 and 2001, all CEECs adopted national state aid legislation 
which transposed core elements of the state aid acquis into national law and laid 
down the procedure of national state aid control. 
By and large, the Commission’s strategy for extending European state aid 
rules to the CEECs was successful and has been applied to other candidate 
countries since then (Blauberger 2009). During the first years after accession, the 
Commission had to solve some very specific legal questions regarding the period 
immediately before accession and to assess a considerable number of state aid 
measures for firms in difficulty from the CEECs. Apart from these short-term 
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challenges, the new entrants are controlled by the Commission as any other member 
state today and they do not pose any particular compliance problem. Before 
accession, however, the overall picture looked quite different. National monitoring 
authorities played an important role in raising awareness for European state aid rules 
and in developing expertise in the candidate countries. Yet, the enforcement record 
of national monitoring authorities was only partly satisfactory for the Commission 
(ibid. 2009: 1036f.). In particular in between the signing of the accession treaties and 
accession, many governments from CEECs used their last opportunity to spend 
considerable amounts of state aid. The real adjustment of their state aid policies took 
place just after accession, when national state aid legislation had become obsolete 
and the exclusive competence to control had been transferred to the Commission.13
Drawing its lessons from Eastern enlargement in 2004, the Commission tried 
to tighten pre-accession requirements and to improve national monitoring authorities’ 
enforcement record in other candidate countries. In regard to Romania and Bulgaria, 
the EU threatened to postpone accession by one year if the acquis criterion was not 
met satisfactorily and, more specifically, Romania could not receive the status of 
‘existing aid’ for any of its measures before May 2006 (von Borries 2006). Current 
candidate countries are still in the process of passing domestic state aid legislation 
and establishing national monitoring authorities (Turkey), or the Commission 
pressures them to improve administrative capacity (Macedonia) and rule enforcement 
(Croatia). For their further development, a scenario similar to the CEECs seems 
likely: EU rules have to be adopted before accession, but their strict enforcement will 
only be possible under Commission surveillance. 
  
In the case of public procurement, the EU White Paper ‘Preparation of the 
Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal 
Market of the Union’ provided guidance for the legislative measures to be adopted by 
CEECs. In particular, administrative procedures in the field of public procurement had 
to be reformed in order to encourage competition between potential suppliers. The 
EU supported the CEECs financially in establishing these administrative rules in the 
context of its pre-accession Phare programme (Kanaras 2000: 110). Companies from 
the old EU member states gained access to public tenders in the CEECs after a 
                                                 
13 Focusing mainly on antitrust, Hoelscher and Stephan (2009: 883) draw a similar conclusion. They still identify a 
certain enforcement gap of national competition authorities in the CEECs compared to old member states, but 
they are confident that the Commission fills this gap. While being rather sceptical as regards sustainable 
enforcement of European state aid rules after the financial crisis, they do not show why this should be a specific 
problem of the new member states. 
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transitional period of up to ten years from the entry into force of the Europe 
Agreements (Hupkes 1997: FN 29). By contrast, suppliers from the CEECs were 
granted access to public tenders in the EU directly by the Europe Agreements. This 
was meant to provide an additional incentive for CEEC governments to adopt EU 
public procurement rules as CEEC companies could hardly compete with suppliers 
from EU member states without adequate knowledge of and resources for European 
procurement procedures (Hupkes 1997: 51).  
The Stabilisation and Accession Agreements with Croatia and Macedonia 
contain similar provisions regarding the opening up of public procurement 
procedures. The transitional period was reduced from ten to a maximum of five 
years. The negotiations with Turkey concerning public procurement have not yet 
been opened.  
4.3 Associated countries  
The EU tries to extend the ‘level playing field’ in state aid matters also to those 
European countries that do not (yet) have an EU membership perspective. Currently, 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are associated countries 
under Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). Each SAA contains a state 
aid prohibition modelled after Article 107(1) TFEU and a general obligation to assess 
competition cases ‘on the basis of criteria arising from the application of the 
competition rules applicable in the Community’ (cf. Cremona 2003: 266).  
Given that most governments in associated countries aspire to EU 
membership, the EU can apply a weaker version of accession conditionality: in order 
to obtain the status of an accession candidate, associated countries must signal their 
willingness and capacity to comply with the acquis. The Commission, therefore, 
treats associated countries as ‘potential candidates’ which, in the long-run, have to 
fulfil the same Copenhagen criteria as previous accession countries. The annual 
progress reports on associated countries are structured largely identical to those of 
candidate countries, but the different sections do not have the status of accession 
negotiation chapters.14
                                                 
14 See Footnote 
 The particular approach to state aid control is the same as in 
CEECs and current candidate countries. Domestic state aid legislation needs to be 
passed and a national monitoring authority has to be established. In Albania and 
Montenegro, for example, these basic conditions had been met by the end of 2007 
12 for the progress reports. Interestingly, the progress reports are published by the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Enlargement, even though associated countries are labelled only ‘potential candidates’. 
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and first reports on national state aid expenditure were published in 2008. Thus, even 
without candidate status, these countries are already more advanced in the 
implementation of EU state aid rules than the accession country Turkey.  
In general, however, there are strong reasons to doubt whether the transfer of 
European state aid and public procurement rules to non-member states and even 
non-candidates can be effective. Based on their analysis of the enlargement 
preparations until 2004, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004: 671f.) argue that 
domestic adoption of EU rules depended mainly on the credibility of the membership 
perspective and that rule adoption improved significantly the closer the reward of 
accession came. By contrast, outside the enlargement context, the Commission can 
only consult national authorities and request enforcement of European rules, but it 
has no sanctions or incentives other than the long-term perspective of EU 
membership to offer (Van de Casteele 2006: 800f.). None of the associated 
countries, according to the Commission’s progress reports, has so far been able to 
effectively enforce European state aid rules and in the area of public procurement 
only limited progress has been documented so far.  
Finally, the EU has concluded a considerable number of bilateral agreements 
in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular with countries from 
Northern Africa and with former Soviet republics, which include references to 
European state aid rules. Provisions on state aid can also be found in agreements 
with individual countries such as South Africa and Chile – in the latter case, however, 
without incorporation of any specific EU rules, but only with a general reference to the 
rights and obligations stemming from WTO rules on subsidies. By and large, these 
agreements aim at improving state aid transparency and awareness in the target 
countries, but they do not impose enforceable obligations nor do they establish 
independent monitoring authorities. Hence, the power of EU rules clearly decreases 
from (i) largely identical EFTA rules and institutions to (ii) rule convergence, but 
enforcement deficits in candidate and potential candidate countries to (iii) modest 
efforts in increasing state aid transparency beyond these contexts.  
5 Regulatory transfer to the WTO level  
After discussing the horizontal transfer of European state aid and procurement law, 
we now turn to the vertical ‘upload’ of these regulatory systems to the WTO level. 
The reasons for the EU to upload its rules are the same as in the case of horizontal 
transfer, but the starting position is quite different. While most associated and 
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accession countries had hardly any state aid and public procurement policies prior to 
EU rule transfer, different regulatory approaches compete at the international level. 
As Kal Raustiala (2002: 35-43) has argued, the field of international competition 
policy is characterised by two partly divergent approaches – those of the US and the 
EU – with similar levels of regulatory power. Hence, depending on the degree of 
consent between these two powers, we find regulatory upload or, in case of dissent, 
rather vague compromises at the WTO level. The latter is true for global state aid 
law, while public procurement rules are largely identical at EU and WTO levels.  
The EU’s latest window of opportunity to transfer rules up to the WTO level 
was the Uruguay Round from 1989 to 1994. The EU strongly lobbied during these 
negotiations for an export of European rules to the international level. Eventually, 
both regulatory systems (state aid and procurement law) were revised and two new 
international agreements were enacted.  
5.1 The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
The expression for state aid at the WTO level is subsidies. Previous to the Uruguay 
Round, a ‘Subsidies Code’ was applied, which interpreted the relevant articles of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concerning subsidies and 
countervailing measures. Though legally binding, this system proved to be inoperable 
from the perspective of the EU (Luengo Hernández de Madrid 2007: 83f.). Neither an 
overall reduction of subsidies nor a decrease in countervailing measures by the US 
had been achieved. Against this background, the Uruguay Round included 
negotiations on subsidy control and the EU tried to promote its own practice in this 
field. The outcome of the Uruguay Round was the adoption of the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), a multilateral agreement which is 
mandatory for all WTO members. By and large, however, the EU had only limited 
success in exporting its own state aid rules. Significant compromises with the US had 
to be made – as regards (i) the definition of subsidies (which had not been addressed 
in the previous Subsidies Code), (ii) possible exceptions from the state aid prohibition 
as well as (iii) the control procedure.  
As regards (i) the definition of subsidies, the US broadly argued for an 
understanding of subsidies as a cause of market distortion. Subsidies impede the 
efficient allocation of resources and were to be combated with penalties such as 
countervailing duties (Antidistortion School, cf. Hufbauer & Shelton Erb 1984: 21). 
According to this view, a subsidy exists when it is possible to measure a benefit for 
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firms. Such a benefit is present when the beneficiary receives an advantage 
compared to normal market conditions (Luengo Hernández de Madrid 2007: 84).  
The EU, represented by the Commission, advocated a more differentiated 
approach which largely followed the system of a state aid prohibition with possible 
exceptions arising from Article 107 TFEU. Unlike the US, the EU asserted that 
subsidising can be an option to correct market failures. Accordingly, subsidies should 
only be prohibited if industry causes an injury in another country because of 
subsidies (Injury-Only School, cf. Hufbauer & Shelton Erb 1984: 19). In order to 
identify a subsidy, the EU also proposed the criterion of benefit or financial 
contribution. In line with its own interpretation of Article 107(1) of the EC Treaty, 
however, the criterion of financial contribution should not be regarded to be fulfilled if 
a measure did not include any cost or charge on the public account (Luengo 
Hernández de Madrid 2007: 84). As a result, the EU advocated a somewhat 
narrower, but more precise, definition of prohibited state aid in order to prevent cases 
in which state aid was granted legally by EU member states but considered illegal at 
WTO level. Otherwise, the Commission feared that other WTO members, particularly 
the United States, would make (excessive) use of their right to impose countervailing 
duties.  
The compromise that resulted from the negotiations included as a main 
novelty a definition for subsidies in Article 1 of the SCM. Accordingly, a subsidy exists 
if (1) there is a financial contribution by a government which (2) confers a benefit to 
certain enterprises. This wording left the question undecided if a charge on the public 
account was needed to define a measure as a subsidy or not (Rubini 2005: 160). The 
question whether a subsidy necessarily involves a charge on the public account was 
finally decided upon by the dispute settlement bodies (Rubini 2009: 141). The panel 
and the appellate bodies decided against the European position and interpreted the 
wording of Article 1 of the SCM in accordance with the US understanding of 
subsidies.15
                                                 
15 The first reports regarding this question were the WTO Panel and WTO Appellate Body reports in the case 
Canada-Civilian Aircraft (WT/DS70/R, 1999 and WT/DS70/AB/R, 1999). In this case, Brazil complained that 
Canada granted prohibited export subsidies to the Canadian civil aircraft. One of the contentious questions was, if 
a granted credit should be considered a subsidy when this credit did not involve a cost to government. 
Interestingly, this issue was not debated as a question of the first element of a subsidy in Art.1 SCM (a “financial 
contribution”) but as a question of the benefit criterion. The EC participated as a third party in this WTO case and 
pointed to the fact that “a cost to government” is a not a question of benefit but of the first element “the financial 
contribution”. Furthermore the EC was of the opinion that the "cost to government" is the appropriate measure of 
a "financial contribution" (WT/DS70/AB/R, 1999, para. 97). This point however, was not addressed by either the 
parties or the DSB organs (Slotboom 2002: 535). The result of the case was the finding that a “cost to 
government” is not necessarily needed to define the term benefit. Furthermore it was stated that the appropriate 
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As regards (ii) possible exceptions to the state aid prohibition, different 
categories of subsidies are established in Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8 of the SCM that 
might, at first sight, resemble those in Articles 107(3)b,c of the EC Treaty. However, 
the categories of the SCM are not formulated as exceptions as in the European 
system, but they follow the so-called ‘traffic-light-approach’: red for ‘prohibited’ 
subsidies, amber for ‘actionable’ subsidies and green for ‘non-actionable’ subsidies.  
The first category (‘prohibited’) includes according to Article 3 SCM non-
primary export subsidies provided by governments as illustrated in Annex 1 of the 
SCM, e.g. internal transport and freight charges on export shipments on terms more 
favorable than for domestic shipments. Subsidies that fall within this category have to 
be withdrawn. The idea of banning these subsidies found strong approval among 
WTO member states. The European system similarly prohibits this category of 
subsidies, for example in Article 1 of the Commission Regulation 69/2001 (Rubini 
2005: 176).  
The second category (‘actionable’) contains according to Article 5 and 6 SCM 
subsidies which cause adverse effects for the interests of another member states e.g. 
by causing serious prejudice to its domestic industry. The control of actionable 
subsidies follows a two-track approach, through (1) countervailing duties or (2) 
agreement discipline. To reach agreement discipline, either the subsidy can be 
removed or the other member state can be compensated (Stehn 1996: 6f.). This 
category had already been included in the Tokyo Round and was not strongly 
contested by the EU or the US. 
As was expected, the most difficult category was the green basket of ‘non-
actionable’ subsidies (Article 8). This category was included as a result of European 
pressures. Here, the EU tried to establish its state aid exception system (Didier 1999: 
256) in order improve legal certainty for EU member states. State aid granted legally 
in the EU should be also in compliance with WTO regulations. The US, in contrast, 
opposed the green basket as it was regarded as a loophole for EU member states in 
order to circumvent the SCM by disguising their measures as non-actionable 
subsidies (Luengo Hernández de Madrid 2007: 87). Due to US resistance, Article 31 
SCM included a review provision of Article 8 SCM after a period of five years. After 
those five years, the US was still reluctant to extend the provision. Furthermore, 
many developing countries were concerned that the provision favoured developed 
                                                                                                                                                        




Finally, (iii) the SCM establishes rules on the control procedure and on 
measures that are applicable once a prohibited, actionable or non-actionable state 
aid is granted (Ehlermann & Goyette 2006: 717). The general instrument against 
distortive subsidies provided for in the SCM agreement is a countervailing duty on 
another member state’s product. The possibility of countervailing duties already 
existed under the previous regime. Yet, the establishment of three different 
categories (prohibited, actionable and non-actionable) of subsidies and the direct 
linkage of these categories to the regulation of countervailing duties were considered 
improvements of the SCM (Stehn 1996).  
 Since no consensus about the extension of Article 8 SCM 
could be reached until the end of 1999, the category of non-actionable subsidies 
expired in the year 2000 (Rubini 2005: 185).  
5.2 The General Procurement Agreement  
Public procurement has been an issue at the international level for a long time. 
International procurement regulation was already discussed as a part of the 
International Trade Organization (ITO) negotiations. When the Havana Charter of 
1948 on the establishment of the ITO failed to pass US Congress, however, public 
procurement had already been excluded from the agenda during the negotiations 
(Blank & Marceau 1997: 31ff.) Later, the EU gained a dominant influence on the 
development of international procurement law. This influence was much greater than 
in the field of state aid control, mainly for two reasons: the EU could promote its own 
system, first, because of the lack of alternative regulatory models in this field and, 
second, because the EU could build a consensus with the US prior to establishing 
international rules. 
In the 1960s, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) started an attempt to establish international procurement rules. The first draft 
set of guidelines of the OECD’s working group was finalised in 1965. At the same 
time, the first draft of the European Procurement Directive 70/32/EWG was published 
(Delsaux 1997: 407). After fifteen years of talks, OECD member countries decided to 
conduct further negotiations on international procurement rules within the framework 
of the Tokyo Round. The final OECD document, the “Draft Instrument on 
Government Purchasing Policies“ which summarized the conclusions reached in 
                                                 
16 Minutes of the regular meeting of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing measure held on 1-2 
November 1999, G/SCM/M/24 
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fifteen years, was delivered to the Tokyo Round. Simultaneously, European efforts to 
harmonise procurement procedures resulted in a comprehensive set of coordinative 
Directives and this was “certainly not a complete coincidence” (Delsaux 1997: 407).  
During the Tokyo Round, Europe – based on its own experiences – clearly set 
the agenda with regard to international procurement rules. The development of 
European procurement rules and the related expertise regarding technical and 
procedural questions strengthened the European position during the negotiations on 
international procurement rules. Unlike all other parties, the European Commission 
was in a position to illustrate a detailed set of rules which were not only transparent 
but also more easily readable than regulations in other countries (Delsaux 1997: 
415). Furthermore, this preparatory work made it easier for the European member 
states to accept international regulation in this field (Arrowsmith 2003: 33). 
Nevertheless, the final Tokyo Round Agreement on Government Procurement had a 
very limited coverage (Blank & Marceau 1997: 31ff.). For example, electrical 
generating and telecommunications equipment – two sectors that had also been 
excluded from EC Directives – were exempted from the final agreement. In addition, 
only the federal level of government was covered by the rules and a small number of 
countries signed up to the agreement (Arrowsmith 2003: 33). 
A major breakthrough towards a more ambitious international agreement was 
the declared willingness of the EU and the US to open up their telecommunications 
markets in the early 1990s (Delsaux 1997: 413). By starting bilateral negotiations on 
this issue, both countries believed to promote the establishment of international rules 
in the long run. Indeed, the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between the two 
countries, agreed in May 199317
                                                 
17 Official Journal 1993, L 125/1. 
, was decisive for the amendment of the 
procurement agreement of the Tokyo Round. Eventually, the Uruguay Round 
negotiations led to the General Procurement Agreement (GPA) which entered into 
force in January 1996. Unlike the SCM, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement, 
membership is not mandatory and its terms apply only to signatory states. The GPA 
largely extended the scope of procurement rules, while the rules on discrimination 
and the award procedure remained largely unchanged. Clearly reflecting the 
European approach, non-discrimination and transparency are key principles in the 
GPA (Delsaux 1997: 413). 
24 
6 Conclusion 
In summary, European rules on state aid and public procurement are designed to 
guarantee free and fair competition in the internal market. Yet they scarcely address 
the international dimension of competition policy. If the Commission does not want to 
be blamed for reducing the global competitiveness of European firms, it can either 
loosen its own rules or it can try to extend the ‘level playing field’ beyond EU borders 
by exporting European state aid and public procurement law. Our article has given an 
overview of the Commission’s various efforts to transfer EU rules horizontally, to non-
EU countries, as well as vertically, to the WTO level. The success of EU regulatory 
transfer differs: Bilateral cooperation provides many opportunities to spread 
European state aid rules, in particular if domestic rule adoption is a condition for EU 
accession. Ultimately, however, strict enforcement is only guaranteed by an 
independent authority, i.e. by the Commission itself or the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority. Vertical upload of European rules to the multilateral (or plurilateral) WTO 
heavily depends on the EU’s ability to reach prior consensus with its most powerful 
counterpart, the US government.  
Besides avoiding disadvantages for European firms, EU regulatory transfer 
may even produce benefits for them and for EU institutions. Firms that are already 
familiar with EU rules can save transaction costs that would arise from divergent 
rules at different levels or in different countries. Moreover, if questions of 
interpretation arise in the application of rules that are modelled after EU law, 
European jurisprudence takes a leading role beyond its proper jurisdiction. Lastly, 
given the growing competitive pressures from emerging market economies and the 
advancing legalisation of international trade, we should clearly expect questions of 
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